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Abstract
The ‘war on terror ’ has led to grave human rights violations and, in response, to a
growing volume of human rights litigation. This article provides an overview of
litigation that has unfolded in recent years in relation to issues such as arbitrary
detention, torture and ill-treatment, extraordinary rendition, extraterritorial
application of human rights norms and the creeping reach of the ‘ terrorism ’ label.
These cases provide a prism through which are displayed key characteristics of the war
on terror as it affects human rights, and enables us to begin to ask questions regarding
the role of the courts and the impact of human rights litigation in this area.
On 12 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the United States decided that persons
detained by the United States in Guanta´namo Bay have the constitutional privilege
of habeas corpus. The recognition that all detainees are entitled to this basic right,
irrespective of their nationality, their designation as ‘enemy combatants ’ or their
offshore location, has been hailed as a victory for the rule of law. Jubilation is
somewhat tempered by the fact that it took six years to decide that detainees are
entitled to a protection that would normally guarantee judicial access within hours,
days or maybe weeks.
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Whether you see the Boumediene judgment as a historic victory for justice
or a reminder of its woeful failure, it tells a story. It provides a graphic illustration
of how far executive violations of human rights have gone in the name of security,
and of the nature of the judicial response : deferential and perhaps faltering at first,
gradually ceding to a more invigorated role as a matter of last resort.
This judgment is only one part of a burgeoning mass of litigation, each
component of which tells its own story. Cases vary as vastly in their goals – gaining
access to information, challenging the legality of detention, preventing expulsion
or deportation, securing acknowledgement of and compensation for wrongs, for
example – as they do in their processes and outcomes. This article will present a
necessarily brief survey of some of this practice of human rights litigation to date at
the national, regional and international levels.1
An enquiry into current litigation practice can serve several purposes.
First, it provides an insight into key human rights issues arising in the so-called
‘global war on terror ’. Looking at issues through cases necessarily gives a limited
perspective : a case concerns a particular individual and particular sets of facts as
assessed against the particular legal issues within the jurisdiction of the particular
court. The number of affected individuals that make it to court is a tiny minority.
But, taken together, the practice of litigation in relation to international terrorism
over the past few years provides a prism through which, I believe, are displayed
quite vividly some of the key characteristics of the global war on terror, its objective
and modus operandi.
Second, the brief survey of litigation practice may provide a comparative
framework for assessing the impact and limitations of that litigation itself, and the
role of the courts in responding to the human rights challenges posed by the war on
terror. It remains early days for any such assessment. The cycle of litigation takes
time, particularly in the light of the challenges to bringing litigation in this field in
the first place, some of which will be explored below, and relatively few cases have
run their course. Certainly any assessment of the impact of litigation has to be seen
through a long-term lens and anything like a meaningful audit of impact would
have to wait perhaps another ten years. But the extent of recent developments
suggests that it is timely to at least begin to enquire into practice to date and to ask
questions regarding the role of the courts in this context.
I shall therefore look first at cases that have arisen post-9/11 addressing
five groups of issues (which I believe are illustrative of key characteristics of the
‘war on terror ’ as it affects human rights). These issues are arbitrary detention,
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations, torture and related
1 This note focuses on select human rights cases against state violations brought before national or, to a
lesser extent, regional and international human rights bodies. In many of the cases cited in this survey,
INTERIGHTS was involved as representative or third party/amicus curiae intervener. It is noted that
cases that serve human rights ends can take many other forms, from civil cases against corporations to
criminal cases against individual members of intelligence agencies or – on the basis of universal juris-
diction – against high government officials. There are examples of such cases being brought in the
relation to the GWOT but these are not addressed here.
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safeguards, extraordinary rendition, and the spreading reach of the ‘terrorist ’ label
and notions of guilt by association. In the conclusion I shall return to the question
of the role of the courts and the impact of human rights litigation.
Issue 1: Arbitrary detention
Guanta´namo
Probably the most notorious issue, and certainly the one giving rise to the most
voluminous litigation, is the Guanta´namo anomaly. The facts related to the de-
tention of hundreds of enemy aliens by US personnel in Guanta´namo Bay need no
introduction.
Detentions at Guanta´namo have spurred a litany of litigation in US courts
(as well as beyond),2 focusing mainly on two issues : the right to habeas corpus and
the lawfulness of trial by military commission. It is worth sketching out the de-
velopment of these cases in US courts and the curious game of legal ping-pong that
has been played out between the judicial and political branches in the past couple
of years, culminating in the 2008 Boumediene judgment referred to above.
Round 1: in 2004 a series of cases made their way through US courts
challenging the denial of the right of access of detainees to a court to challenge the
designation of the individuals in question as ‘enemy combatants ’ and the law-
fulness of their detention.3 This led to two judgments handed down in June 2004.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,4 the Supreme Court held that US nationals had certain
constitutional rights, including having ‘a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker ’. Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor famously cautioned on the behalf of the Court that ‘We have long
since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens’.5 This 2004 case was seen to represent
an important marker of executive accountability, albeit in the limited cases where
the detainees are US nationals.
2 As regards US responsibility under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, see Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guanta´namo Bay, 13 March 2002.
Another line of litigation has concerned the role of other states in transferring or failing to support
nationals detained in Guanta´namo : see, e.g., ECtHR, Boumediene and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Application Nos. 38703/06, 40123/06, 43301/06, 43302/06, 2131/07 and 2141/07 found inadmissable by
the ECtHR on 18 November 2008 before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR=Convention),
or England and Wales Court of Appeal, R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ 1598.
3 Two of the three groups of cases concerned US nationals detained in the United States or outside, and
the third (affecting the vast majority of detainees) concerned non-nationals detained beyond US soil.
The first of these cases – Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) – is less relevant, as it concerned
a US citizen who was ultimately transferred to the regular criminal justice system within the United
States, charged with conspiracy and found guilty before a federal court.
4 US Supreme Court, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi as next friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi,
Petitioners v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 542 US 507 (2004) decided June 28 2004.
5 Ibid., 536.
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In respect of the right of habeas corpus of the vast majority of detainees
who were non-nationals detained outside the United States, in Rasul & Ors v. Bush6
the Supreme Court took a far more cautious approach. It refrained from address-
ing the issue as a constitutional rights issue. But the Court found, by reference to a
statute conferring jurisdiction on courts, that there was nothing to prevent the
courts from exercising jurisdiction in these cases.
The government’s response to these judgments is well known. As regards
US nationals, one had already been released and the other was transferred to reg-
ular courts.7 As regards the hundreds of non-nationals detained at Guanta´namo,
the response was quite different. First, the executive introduced the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards in an apparent attempt
to provide a habeas corpus substitute, despite these being non-judicial mechanisms
that lacked basic procedural rights associated with the right of habeas corpus.8 This
provided cover for congressional follow-up with the Detainee Treatment Act 2005
(DTA), which, in addition to some positive provisions on treatment of detainees,
responded to the judgment by making it explicit that there is no right of habeas
corpus for Guanta´namo detainees.
Round 2: this led to a second round at the Supreme Court in the form of
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.9 The US government claimed that the DTA had stripped
Hamdan of his right to habeas corpus. In its June 2006 judgment, the Court again
refrained from addressing the question whether there was a constitutional right to
habeas corpus that rendered the DTA’s purported habeas corpus stripping un-
constitutional. It found instead that the Act did not apply to Hamdan anyway, as
his case was ongoing at the time the DTA was adopted.
Having determined that it had jurisdiction, the Court went on to find that
basic due process guarantees contained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, incorporated into US law by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ)10 statute, applied to all detainees. The decision that the military com-
missions were unlawful because they violated these basic provisions was an im-
portant and positive decision in terms of rights protection. It is noteworthy,
though, that Hamdan is not framed in terms of ‘ individual rights ’, but as a sep-
aration of powers issue, addressing whether ‘ the President has acted in a way that
exceeded [congressional] limits ’.
6 US Supreme Court, Shafiq Rasul, et al., Petitioners v. George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al. ;
Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad al Odah, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al., 542 US 466, decided June
28 2004.
7 See notes on Padilla and Hamdi, above notes 3 and 4.
8 For an analysis of the operation of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, where detainees lack access
to the evidence against them, see Mark Denbeaux et al., No-Hearing Hearings : CSRT : The Modern
Habeas Corpus ?, available at http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf (last visited
15 October 2008).
9 US Supreme Court, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Petitioner v. Donald H. Rumsfeld & Others, 548 US 557
(2006).
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice, UCMJ, 64 Stat. 109, 10 USC ch.47.
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Nonetheless, there had been a finding by the Supreme Court that the
executive’s conduct violated international and domestic law. The US government
again faced the quandary of how to respond to this judicial slight. With the 2006
Military Commission Act, Congress responded in two ways. First, it determined
that the relevant international law – the Geneva Conventions – could no longer be
relied upon as a source of rights in habeas corpus or other civil proceedings against
US personnel. Second, it provided that courts would not have jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus applications (or any other action) by any person determined to be
an enemy combatant or awaiting such determination, thus extending the juris-
diction-stripping provisions of the DTA beyond Guanta´namo to detentions any-
where.11 Rather than a response that would seek to deal with the problem by
bringing policy in line with law, the law was identified as the problem, and inter-
national sources of law and judicial oversight of them were removed.
Despite several Supreme Court judgments, the basic question of whether
constitutional due process and habeas corpus protections apply to non-nationals
detained outside US territory remained unanswered until June 2008.12 With no
further possibility of constitutional avoidance, in Boumediene v. Bush13 the issue
was finally resolved in the affirmative. The US Supreme Court ruled that ‘enemy
combatants ’ held by the United States at Guanta´namo Bay have the right under the
US Constitution to challenge their detention before regular courts. The Court also
ruled that the procedures for review of the detainees’ status under the 2005
Detainee Treatment Act were not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas
corpus. It therefore declared unconstitutional section 7 of the 2006 Military
Commissions Act, which denied habeas corpus to any detained foreign ‘enemy
combatant ’.
The importance of this ruling should not be underestimated. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of habeas corpus as the fundamental
rights issue it is. It rejects artificial distinctions based on nationality or geographical
location as relevant to determining the existence of rights and obligations.
11 MCA, s.7(1)(e) :
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (10 USC 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any
other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant or is awaiting such determination.
12 Little clarity was provided by lower courts. In two cases – Al Odah and Boumediene – the district courts
reached completely different outcomes and, on 20 February 2007, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
2–1 that the Guanta´namo detainees have no constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their de-
tentions in federal court.
13 US Supreme Court, Lakhdar Boumediene, et al., Petitioners v. George W. Bush, President of the United
States, et al., 553 US.
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It represents the willingness of the judiciary to engage and fulfil their democratic
mandate and reinforce the legal and constitutional limits on executive action. How
the executive responds to those decisions will also be an important measure of the
state of health of the rule of law and the separation of powers.14 It will also deter-
mine what the ruling means in practice for the approximately 270 detainees re-
maining in Guanta´namo Bay.
At the same time, the judgment itself was a close 5:4 decision, with some
strident dissents that graphically demonstrate the extent of the antipathy of certain
judges to step into what they see as issues of security properly for executive de-
termination.15 Of most concern, of course, is simply the time it has taken to reach
this decision. Litigation is a time-consuming business, and due process of law and
respect for the judicial function require that it be allowed to run its course.
Undoubtedly, some gains have been made at each stage of this judicial marathon
(as I shall return to when looking at the question of impact later). But one has to
ask whether the judicial process has not been characterized by undue constitutional
avoidance, as well as excessive judicial deference to the executive and congressional
decision-making role, in the refusal to address the constitutional question at an
earlier stage. Unfortunately, the political organs did not repay the democratic
compliment and react to judicial suggestions about the need to bring policy into
line with law.16 Whether this was a miscalculation as to how the political branches
would respond, or a strict approach to the judicial doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, is open to question. But the somewhat anomalous result is a decision six
years down the line that the right to habeas corpus applies, theoretically guaran-
teeing access to a court within hours or days of arrest and detention. One must
question the extent to which this constitutes a meaningful a judicial response for
this sort of emergency remedy.
The same day that the US Supreme Court handed down its judgment in
Boumediene it also handed down Munaf v. Geren,17 in which it acknowledged that
persons detained in Iraq also have the right to habeas corpus. It found that in the
Iraqi context it was Iraqi courts that should exercise jurisdiction, and it therefore
denied the jurisdiction of US courts on that basis. But the case is significant in
reinforcing the principle that the right of habeas corpus applies to persons detained
by US personnel beyond US jurisdiction. This may become particularly important
14 While President Bush’s immediate response to the judgment was equivocal, US President Barak Obama
indicated shortly upon taking office that the Guantanamo facility would be closed. ‘ Obama plans
executive order to close Guantanamo Bay ’ CNN on-line, 22 January 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/
POLITICS/01/21/guantanamo.hearings/index.html.
15 This was graphically demonstrated by the tone and content of some of the dissents, notably Scalia J’s
assertion of the ‘ disastrous conse-quences ’ of the majority judgment which he claimed ‘ will almost
certainly cause more Ameri-cans to be killed ’. Boumediene, above note 13, Dissenting Judgment of
Scalia J, p. 2.
16 E.g., as noted above, Congress reacted to the Hamdan judgment by divesting the courts of jurisdiction
and of ‘ inconvenient ’ sources of law, rather than taking the judicial lead and bringing policy into line
with law.
17 Munaf et al. v. Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al., Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia circuit, No. 06–1666. Argued March 25, 2008 – Decided 12 June 2008.
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in a context of increasing resort to Guanta´namo ‘alternatives ’ in the form of
detention abroad.
Belmarsh
In 2004, parallel cases made their way through the English courts, resulting in the
famous A & Ors derogation case before the House of Lords (Belmarsh judgment).18
The case concerned the detention of non-UK nationals in Belmarsh prison on the
basis of their suspected involvement in international terrorism, pursuant to the
2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.19 In order to allow such a measure,
the United Kingdom had derogated from its obligations in respect of the right to
liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The case raised different issues from those before US courts. The UK Act
itself provided for regular independent review by the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission, which is a court of law, albeit in the context of limited and contro-
versial rules and procedures.20 The right of habeas corpus was not, as such, in
dispute in the United Kingdom, and the case that made its way to the House of
Lords concerned the lawfulness of the derogation and of the detention itself.
When the matter went before the House of Lords – the supreme court of
appeal in the United Kingdom – the court found that the United Kingdom’s
derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights to enable it to
detain people on national security grounds, potentially indefinitely, was not valid.
The majority deferred to the government’s assessment of the existence of an
‘emergency’ justifying derogation. However, they found that the detention of non-
nationals could not be justified as strictly required by that emergency. The judg-
ment notes that ‘ If derogation is not strictly required in the case of one group
[nationals], it cannot be strictly required in the case of the other group [non-
nationals] that presents the same threat. ’21 The court therefore found a violation of
18 UK House of Lords Appellate Committee, A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, X
and another v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (A & Ors (Derogation)).
19 See sections 21–32 of the United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, which
‘ allow[s] the detention of those the Secretary of State has certified as threats to national security and who
are suspected of being international terrorists where their removal is not possible at the present time.
These provisions change the current law, which allows detention with a view to removal only where
removal is a realistic option within a reasonable period of time … ’.
20 Controversial rules related to, for example, access to counsel and to evidence. See, e.g., the report of the
United Kingdom’s Parliamentary Constitutional Affairs Committee ‘ The operation of the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates ’, report of session 2004/5,
HC 323-II, available at www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmconst/
323/323ii.pdf (last visited 15 October 2008). See also, e.g., ‘ Ian Macdonald QC resigns from SIAC ’,
1 November 2004, available at www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/news/news_detail.cfm?iNewsID=268
(last visited 20 April 2008).
21 A & Ors (Derogation), above note 17, Lord Bingham, para. 132 : ‘ I would hold that the indefinite
detention of foreign nationals without trial has not been shown to be strictly required, as the same threat
from British nationals whom the government is unable or unwilling to prosecute is being met by other
measures which do not require them to be detained indefinitely without trial. The distinction which the
government seeks to draw between these two groups – British nationals and foreign nationals – raises an
issue of discrimination. But, as the distinction is irrational, it goes to the heart of the issue about
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the rights to liberty and to non-discrimination, provided for in law in the United
Kingdom via Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.
The positive significance of this decision lies on many different levels. The
first relates to the obvious importance of the strict approach to the protection of
the right to liberty and the need for careful but challenging judicial oversight.
Beyond that, the case did what much of debate and indeed litigation elsewhere –
including the US litigation referred to above – had neglected to do, in signalling the
centrality of the equality issue. This is particularly significant in a context of fre-
quent reliance on divisions and distinctions based on nationality as well as other
grounds as a basis for inferior treatment. While nationality does have some sig-
nificance in the context of the application of certain aspects of international hu-
manitarian law (IHL), it is a critical manifestation of the universality that
underpins human rights law that nationals and non-nationals alike are protected.22
The onus is on the state to demonstrate that discrimination is justified, which it
was unable to do in this case.
The case is also constitutionally significant in its assessment of the proper
judicial role and the limits of due judicial deference. In a powerful passage Lord
Bingham famously rejects the Attorney General’s submissions in this respect, noting,
“I do not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between demo-
cratic institutions and the courts … the function of independent judges … [is]
a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of
law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of
judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in
some way undemocratic.”
Significant too was the executive’s response. The UK government changed
its law and practice in the light of the Belmarsh judgment. The derogation and
offending legislation were withdrawn, and new legislation was adopted, providing,
inter alia, for ‘control orders ’ rather than imprisonment for persons suspected of
involvement in international terrorism.23
proportionality also. It proceeds on the misconception that it is a sufficient answer to the question
whether the derogation is strictly required that the two groups have different rights in the immigration
context. So they do. But the derogation is from the right to liberty. The right to liberty is the same for
each group. If derogation is not strictly required in the case of one group, it cannot be strictly required in
the case of the other group that presents the same threat. ’
22 Only in relation to certain rights in limited circumstances – notably relating to political life – are rights
enjoyed only or to a greater degree by a state’s own citizens. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee
General Comment No. 15, The position of aliens under the Covenant [1986], in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.6 (2003), p. 140. Also note the IACHR comment in relation to Guanta´namo detainees : ‘ [t]he
determination of a state’s responsibility for violations of the international human rights of a particular
individual turns not on the individual’s nationality … ’. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Precautionary Measures in Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba, 13 March 2002.
23 On control orders authorized by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and their operation, see the
statement made by Tony McNulty, Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing
(The Rt Hon Tony McNulty) to Parliament : ‘ Control Orders Update (11 March 2008–10 June 2008) ’,
12 June 2008, available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/news-speeches/control-
orders-update-0608 (last visited 15 October 2008). The Act authorized both derogating control orders,
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These orders spurred their own controversy and their own litigation. The
judgments handed down provide, among other things, an interesting analysis
of what constitutes ‘detention’ as opposed to limits on freedom of movement,
and the stage at which not only physical limits but also the degree of control over
aspects of daily life might amount to unlawful detention.24 The House of Lords
found in one case that those orders that allowed for persons to be confined to
specified areas for up to 18 hours a day and cut off from contact with the outside
world amounted to detention by any other name, and required derogation from
Article 5 of the ECHR. These cases also demonstrated the willingness of the courts
to engage in and seek to grapple with the difficult issue of what balance is an
acceptable one in a democratic society facing the challenge of international
terrorism.
Issue 2: Limiting the applicability of treaty obligations:
extraterritorial application and action pursuant
to Security Council authorization
Extraterritoriality
The rationale behind the Guanta´namo anomaly referred to above was that, due to
its offshore location, the constitutional human rights obligations that normally
apply on US soil would not apply there. As a constitutional matter, the fallacy of
such a distinction has been clarified by the Boumediene and Munaf cases discussed
above. As a matter of international human rights law, the proposition was always
straightforwardly wrong. The complete control exercised by the United States
over the part of Cuba where Guanta´namo lies, as well as over the detainees them-
selves, meant that the United States exercised jurisdiction and control to satisfy
the criteria for applicability of human rights treaties.25 As the Inter-American
where the government recognized that derogation from the ECHR would be required, and non-
derogating orders, where, in the government’s view, it would not.
24 UK House of Lords, Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v. JJ and others (FC)
(Respondents), [2007] UKHL 45, decided 31 October 2007. On control order litigation in Australian
courts, see High Court of Australia, Thomas v. Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, 2 August 2007, available at
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2007/33.html (last visited 15 October 2008), where, in a 5 : 2 de-
cision, the High Court of Australia upheld the constitutionality of a criminal anti-terror law under which
a federal magistrate issued an interim control order.
25 Human rights bodies have long considered the extraterritorial application to depend on whether the
state exercised ‘ effective control ’ abroad. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, which,
following earlier Human Rights Committee decisions, noted that it is unconscionable to permit states to
do abroad what they are prohibited from doing at home. A stricter approach, at least as regards the
ECHR, was apparent when the European Court of Human Rights suggested in the Bankovic v. Belgium
case that control over territory, and not just control over individuals or situations by agents acting
abroad, may be required for the Convention obligations to apply. See, e.g., Helen Duffy, The War
on Terror and the Framework of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005,
pp. 282–9, 332–7.
581
Volume 90 Number 871 September 2008
Commission on Human Rights observed when requesting that the United States
adopt precautionary measures to protect the detainees (a request ultimately
unheeded),’[t]he determination of a state’s responsibility [for human rights
violations] turns not on the individual’s nationality or presence within a particular
geographic area, but rather on whether, under the specific circumstances, that
person fell within the state’s authority and control.’26
While the Guanta´namo anomaly is so stark as to provide an easy target, a
narrow view of extraterritorial application is mirrored elsewhere, albeit in slightly
less caricatured form. In a judgment of June 2007, in Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State
for Defence,27 the House of Lords ruled on the application of the ECHR to the
conduct of British troops in Iraq. The case concerned six appellants, the first five of
whom had been killed by UK ‘patrols ’ in occupied Basra, for example while eating
a family evening meal, during a raid on a family member’s house or while driving a
minibus. The sixth, Baha Mousa Baha, was tortured while in UK custody in Iraq.
The object of the litigation was to compel the government to carry out an inves-
tigation into these violations as required by the ECHR, incorporated via the UK
Human Rights Act.
At first the government argued that the ECHR did not apply to its actions
in Iraq. In the course of litigation the government’s position changed (providing an
example of how the process of litigation can itself quite directly shape policy), and
it argued that the ECHR did apply to persons in UK custody in Iraq but not to
persons killed or injured on the streets of Basra.28
When the case made its way to the highest UK court, the House of Lords,
the court accepted the government’s view as regards the scope of application of
the Convention. It found that while individuals killed or mistreated within UK
‘custody’ are entitled to the protection of the ECHR, those on the streets of
Basra – including those directly shot or mistreated by UK soldiers patrolling
streets – are not.
The strength of the Al-Skeini case lies in its confirmation that for in-
dividuals detained by UK authorities anywhere in the world, the ECHR, and the
Human Rights Act giving effect to it in the United Kingdom, apply. Although
the issues were somewhat different, this sentiment is replicated and reinforced by the
recent finding, in Munaf v. Geren, of the US Supreme Court concerning due process
rights applicable to US detainees in Iraq. This rejects the more restrictive approach
argued by the authorities of the United States, and at an earlier stage, the United
Kingdom, as to the non-applicability of international human rights treaties.
However, on this occasion the House of Lords may have adopted an un-
duly restrictive approach to human rights protection in rejecting the applicability
26 See IACHR Guantanamo Bay Precautionary Measures, above note 21.
27 UK House of Lords, Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, 13 June 2007.
28 At all stages the government denied the extraterritorial applicability of the Human Rights Act (as op-
posed to the ECHR). The government did not challenge the fact that, provided that the Convention and
the UK Act were applicable, there existed an obligation to carry out an investigation and the case should
go back to the divisional court for assessment of the facts.
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of the European Convention beyond situations of detention. It rejected arguments
that the relevant question related to the degree of control the state exercised over
the situation, and whether there was in all the circumstances a sufficiently ‘direct or
immediate ’ link between the extraterritorial conduct and the alleged violation of
individual rights.29 It focused instead on what might be described as formalistic
distinctions based on custody or not. The somewhat anomalous result is that an
individual’s ability to achieve redress depends on whether his abusers were cour-
teous enough to arrest him beforehand, or whether his abuse occurred inside or
outside prison walls. While the implications of this judgment remain to be seen, in
Al-Skeini the House of Lords may have contributed to confusion in an already
murky field.
A restrictive approach to extraterritoriality, and growing confusion in this
area, has potentially important implications for accountability in the war on terror,
a large part of which is being executed extraterritorially. Of course, states continue
to be bound normatively by customary law and IHL. But, as this case shows, the
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is critically important in
practice in a context where the application of human rights law in fact amounts to
the only way of accessing a court of law and ultimately of securing a remedy.30
It remains to be seen whether this somewhat novel approach by the UK
courts will be adopted elsewhere.31 The Committee against Torture (CAT) has
certainly made it clear that the Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment does apply extraterritorially, and has been implicitly
critical of both the United Kingdom and United States for taking an approach
limiting the Convention’s applicability in Iraq or Afghanistan.32 The CAT has
stated, for example, that ‘[t]he State party should recognize and ensure that the
provisions of the Convention expressed as applicable to “territory under the State
party’s jurisdiction” apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the ef-
fective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world. ’
29 For the NGO third-party intervention, including support for the ‘ direct or immediate ’ link, see
www.interights.org.
30 As in the United Kingdom, human rights protections are often incorporated into domestic law.
However, IHL violations lack an enforcement mechanism and, under CAT, neither the United States nor
the United Kingdom has made the declaration required under Art. 22 to allow for individual petitions.
31 The Al Skeini case, above note 26, has been presented to the ECtHR.
32 See, e.g., Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture ; United States of
America, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006 : ‘ The State party should recognize and ensure that
the provisions of the Convention expressed as applicable to “ territory under the State party’s jurisdic-
tion ” apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its authorities, of
whichever type, wherever located in the world. ’ See also Conclusions and recommendations of the
Committee against Torture ; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Crown
Dependencies and Overseas Territories, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3, 10 December 2004 : ‘ The Committee
expresses its concern at … the State party’s limited acceptance of the applicability of the Convention to
the actions of its forces abroad, in particular its explanation that “ those parts of the Convention which
are applicable only in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of a State party cannot be applicable in
relation to actions of the United Kingdom in Afghanistan and Iraq ” ; the Committee observes that the
Convention protections extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of a State party and considers that
this principle includes all areas under the de facto effective control of the State party’s authorities. ’
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Just as Al-Skeini raised questions about the applicability of human rights
treaty obligations extraterritorially, a more recent House of Lords case provoked
questions about the impact of such obligations where the state acts under the
apparent authority of a Security Council resolution. This issue arose in the case of
R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, decided on 12
December 2007.33 A cautious and arguably restrictive approach to human rights
protection was again apparent.
The case concerned Iraqis detained by UK soldiers (acting as part of a UN
force in Iraq) on terrorism charges. The first question the House of Lords ad-
dressed on appeal was whether the government was liable for the appellant’s
allegedly wrongful detention, as opposed to the United Nations being responsible
on the basis that the impugned acts were attributable to the United Nations as a
result of Security Council resolutions authorizing the Multinational Force in Iraq.
The Lords found the question of fact to be whether the United Nations exercised
effective control over UK actions, which it found not to be the case.34 The court had
no difficulty in distinguishing this mission from the Kosovo Force (KFOR), where
more difficult issues of attribution arise.35 Thus the allegedly wrongful conduct was
attributable to the United Kingdom, not the United Nations.
The second question proved more problematic. The court asked itself
whether the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights were qualified by those that arise under the UN Charter, particu-
larly under relevant Security Council resolutions. All five Lords of Appeal found
that the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention had to be
limited by those due under the Charter. They therefore upheld the authority to
detain individuals in Iraq on this basis. However, Lord Bingham found that while
the United Kingdom had the authority to detain the appellant pursuant to Security
Council resolutions, it must still ‘ensure that the detainee’s rights under Article 5
[of the European Convention] are not infringed to any greater extent than is
inherent in such detention’.
The Court did not find, as the applicants had argued, that a distinction
should be drawn between clear obligations under Security Council resolutions, and
other activities that might be authorized by, or indeed broadly carried out pursuant
to, such resolutions. Article 103 of the Charter undoubtedly provides that where
there is a conflict between obligations under the Charter and treaty obligations,
the former prevail. But if the judgment were to be understood as exempting the
whole range of actions taken under Security Council resolutions from human
rights obligations (or indeed those under IHL), the result could be a serious
33 UK House of Lords, R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58,
Judgment of 12 December 2007.
34 As the Lords noted, the United Kingdom had never claimed before the case that the UN did exercise
control over these operations.
35 The majority distinguished the admissibility decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights in Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Application Nos. 71412/
01 and 78166/01, May 2, 2007, which attributed the acts of KFOR to the United Nations and not to the
individual countries that contributed forces to that mission.
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protection gap. This is particularly so in the ‘war against terrorism’ context, where
wide-ranging resolutions have called on far-reaching action against terrorism, but
without clear definition as to either the action required or the nature of the ter-
rorism against which it is directed.
Issue 3: Torture
Practices of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment have come to light
in recent years with increasing regularity, as epitomized by (though far from lim-
ited to) scandals such as Abu Ghraib or Baghram. This has regrettably been coup-
led with attempts to redefine torture according to obscenely high thresholds of
barbarity, to ‘ justify ’ it, inter alia, as a matter of ‘executive privilege ’, or to
undermine procedural safeguards associated with it. I shall highlight a couple of
cases from the other side of the Atlantic that fall into the last category and illustrate
attempts to erode, indirectly, the prohibition.
Deportation to torture or ill-treatment
The first set of cases, Saadi v. Italy36 and Ramzy v. Netherlands37 before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), relate to the deportation of in-
dividuals to states where, the applicants allege, there is a real risk of their being
subject to torture and ill-treatment. When the Ramzy case appeared before the
Court, the Dutch government’s case related, as many in Strasbourg do, to the
difficult and not uncontroversial question of whether there was a real and personal
risk to Mr Ramzy in Algeria. But several other governments, led by the United
Kingdom, changed the face of the case by taking the unusual step of presenting a
third-party intervention.38 They argued that in the light of the growth of ‘Islamist
extremist terrorism’ the Court should re-examine the relationship between pro-
tection from ill-treatment and ‘national security ’ interests. In effect, they argued
that, through introducing a ‘balancing’ test, national security could justify expos-
ing persons to real and imminent risk of torture if those individuals were deemed
by the government to represent a risk. Numerous international NGOs intervened,
based on the absolute nature of the non-refoulement rule (the ban on forcible
return), and the standard for assessing risk.39
36 ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06, Judgment of 28 February 2008.
37 ECtHR, Ramzy v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 25424/05, pending, available at www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/
2005/oct/applicationlodgedramzyvnetherlands.htm (last visited 16 October 2008).
38 The intervention was presented by the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal and the United
Kingdom. See the ‘ refining ’ and limiting of the UK government position to cruel and inhuman treat-
ment in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights Thirty Second report, Session 2005-6,
available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/278/27808.htm (last visited 15
October 2008).
39 For the intervention in the Ramzy case submitted on behalf of several international NGOs, see
www.interights.org.
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When the Saadi case then came before the court addressing similar
issues – Mr Saadi claimed that he would be at risk of torture and ill-treatment in
Tunisia, where mistreatment of alleged terrorists is well documented – the UK
government again seized its opportunity to argue in favour of the ‘balancing’ test
on the same terms as it had in Ramzy. The Saadi case leapfrogged the Ramzy case,
which is still pending at the time of writing, and the Grand Chamber of the Court
handed down judgment on 28 February 2008.
In a unanimous judgment the European Court remained resolute in up-
holding the approach established by its earlier decisions and followed by other
international courts and bodies. The judgment reaffirmed that the prohibition on
transfer of individuals to countries where they face a real risk of torture or other ill-
treatment is part of the absolute prohibition on torture. The Court was emphatic in
recognizing the difficulties states face in countering terrorism, but categorical in its
rebuke of the notion that there are exceptions to the absolute nature of the pro-
hibition of torture or ill-treatment or any room for balancing:
States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their com-
munities from terrorist violence. It cannot therefore underestimate the scale of
the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community.
That must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3 [of
the European Convention, prohibiting torture and other ill-treatment].
Although they were unsuccessful, the very fact that governments made
these interventions, despite the odds of success being seriously stacked against
them (in the light of clear and on-point jurisprudence from the Court itself,40 quite
apart from any of the principles at stake), is telling. It arguably reveals a shift in the
approach to rights protection by certain states at least, and a questioning and
undermining of even the most sacrosanct human rights protections. The resolute
rejection of this approach by the European Court is an example of the important
role of the courts in reaffirming fundamental principles.
A & Ors : admissibility of torture evidence
A second issue related to safeguards against torture, which has arisen in several
states in the context of the fight against international terrorism in recent years, is
the reliance on, and admissibility of, evidence obtained through torture and ill-
treatment.
Again in the United Kingdom, the issue played out in the case of A and
Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2).41 The case concerned
the admissibility, before the UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission, of
40 See, most notably, ECtHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECtHR Reports 1996-V, no. 22, Judgment of 15
November 1996.
41 UK House of Lords, A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71,
Judgment of 9 December 2005.
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evidence that may have been obtained through torture by foreign states. The UK
government advanced the argument – anomalous perhaps, yet accepted by the
Court of Appeal – that evidence obtained through torture at the hand of a UK
official is inadmissible, whereas evidence obtained through torture at the hand of
foreign officials, for whom the United Kingdom is not responsible, is admissible.
In its judgment of 8 December 2005, the House of Lords rejected this
rationale, finding that torture is torture no matter who does it, and that such
evidence can never be admitted in legal proceedings. It also noted the link between
the safeguards against torture and the incidence of torture, finding that the state
‘cannot condemn torture while making use of the mute confession obtained
through torture, because the effect is to encourage torture’.42
The judgment is a strong reassertion of principle, seeing the admissibility
of evidence not only as linked to fair trial issues but also as an inherent aspect of the
positive obligations around the torture prohibition itself. It is worth flagging,
however, that the judgment is somewhat more limited in other respects. First, while
clear on the principle of inadmissibility, it is less clear – and the court was more
cautious – on how the rule would operate in practice. The court found that evi-
dence is inadmissible where the tribunal had ‘established’ on balance of prob-
abilities that it had been obtained under torture. If that is not ‘established’ – as
presumably happens not infrequently in view of the opacity and uncertainty sur-
rounding intelligence – but there remained a real risk that such was the case, the
court found that evidence could be admitted but afforded less weight.43
Second, the court focused on the issue of admissibility in ‘proceedings ’,
but indicated what may be an overly sweeping inclination to accept the lawfulness
of the use of torture evidence for other purposes, such as arrest, search or deten-
tion. The difficult and sensitive issue of the extent of obligations, if any, of states
not to rely on, solicit or trade in evidence obtained through torture outside the
courtroom remains unclear.
Issue 4: Extraordinary rendition
Among the most innovative and the most shocking of the many violations to which
the war on terror has given rise is the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’. Reliable
reports are increasing of the kidnapping and secret transfer of individuals without
any process of law to various locations and/or to third states for what has been
referred to as detention or torture by proxy.44 This is straightforwardly a violation
42 Ibid., p. 30 citing McNally JA.
43 In contrast to the majority finding, compare the test proposed by Lord Bingham, according to which
evidence should be regarded as inadmissible if the executive had been unable to show that it was not
obtained by torture. Ibid., paras. 54–56.
44 See, e.g., Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur Mr Dick Marty,
Alleged secret detentions in Council of Europe member states, Information Memorandum II,
AS/Jur (2006) 03 rev, 22 January 2006, available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/
20060124_Jdoc032006_E.pdf (last visited 15 October 2008).
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of many human rights, on account not only of its eventual purpose – torture,
arbitrary detention or other serious violation – but also due to the procedural
arbitrariness that attends it and, most insidiously, the effect of removing the person
from the protection of law and withholding information from that person and his
or her family. The latter characteristic has led to this practice being described as
enforced disappearance.45
As is perhaps obvious, rendition litigation poses particular challenges for
litigators, which can euphemistically be grouped as ‘access ’ issues of various types :
access to victims, to evidence and to courts. First and most obviously, the cases
often concern disappeared persons. Despite the excellent monitoring work done by
NGOs, journalists and investigators, for the most part we do not know who or
where the victims are, at least not at the point when they most need protection.
While jurisdictions vary, the ability to bring ‘public interest ’ cases without ident-
ified victims is extremely limited. Access to information or evidence is inevitably
extremely challenging, given the clandestine nature of operations, but made even
harder by what has been described as a systematic cover-up to preclude such ac-
cess.46 The third group of access issues relates to effective access to courts. In the
rare situation where a person emerges and is willing to put his or her head above
the parapet again despite past abuses, the state secrets’ doctrine is liable to have the
case thrown out.
This was the experience of Khalid el-Masri, whose case provides graphic
insight into both the practice of extraordinary rendition and the extent of the
secrecy and challenges to litigation in this area.47 El-Masri is a German citizen who
was arrested by Macedonian border officials in December 2003, apparently because
he has the same name as the alleged mentor of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell and on
suspicion that his passport was a forgery. After three weeks he was handed over to
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and flown to Baghdad and then to ‘the
salt pit ’, a covert CIA interrogation centre in Afghanistan. He was held for 14
months, allegedly mistreated and prevented from communicating with anyone
outside the detention facility, including his family and the German government.
Along the way it became apparent to his captors that his passport was genuine and
that he had nothing to do with the other el-Masri, so he was finally set free in May
2004. Instead of the grovelling apology and help in re-establishing his life one
might expect in such circumstances, he was released at night on a desolate road in
Albania.
When questioned in Germany over the el-Masri affair, the US Defence
Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated, ‘ I believe this will be handled in the proper
45 See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, ‘ Spanish judge tells US Guanta´namo is an insult ’, International Herald Tribune,
4 June 2006, available at www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/04/news/gitmo.php (last visited 16 October
2008).
46 See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Information Memorandum II, above note 43.
47 Information on the case is available at www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/29868res20070524.html (last visi-
ted 15 October 2008).
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courts here in Germany and if necessary in American courts as well ’. In fact, when a
lawsuit was brought before a US court, the government invoked the so-called ‘state
secrets ’ privilege, arguing that the ‘entire aim of the case is to establish state
secrets ’. The case was dismissed in its entirety by the US District Court, upheld by
the US Court of Appeals. In October 2007, the Supreme Court decided, without
giving reasons, to refuse to review the case.48 This is not a case in which courts
settled on (or even considered) excluding particular documents, evidence or
sources, holding parts of the hearing in camera, or taking other special measures. It
is simply the end of the line for justice in US courts for el-Masri. The wholesale
vacation of proceedings alleging government misconduct, on the basis of the
government’s own assessment that those proceedings might per se damage national
security, is anathema to justice and a striking illustration of the extent of secrecy in
this area.
The el-Masri case and others like it49 have been taken up elsewhere, but
attempts to secure justice continue to falter. Arrest warrants were issued by a
German court in January 2007. But the German Justice Minister subsequently
announced that, as the United States had made it clear that it would not co-
operate, the German authorities would therefore not be pursuing a formal request
for the extradition of the 13 CIA agents involved in el-Masri’s abduction.50 In a
parallel development, Italian courts too have issued arrest warrants in respect of
another CIA rendition, Abu Omar, who was kidnapped by the CIA while living in
Italy, taken to Egypt and allegedly tortured there. Interestingly, however, the Italian
government has also raised state secrets concerns before the Constitutional Court,
and criminal proceedings have been suspended pending the decision.51
One of the striking characteristics of rendition is its transnational nature,
involving multiple state agents who together share direct and indirect responsi-
bility. It is therefore important that, through litigation and other measures,
attempts are underway to hold a range of states to account separately for assisting
rendition or facilitating or failing to prevent it on their own territory.52
48 In the US Supreme Court, El-Masri v. United States, Case No. 06-1613, petition for a writ of certiorari
denied 9 October 2007. In the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, El-Masri v. Tenet,
Case 1 : 05-cv-01417-TSE-TRJ, order granting US motion to dismiss granted May 12, 2006. For details of
the petition lodged before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, see www.aclu.org/pdfs/
safefree/elmasri_iachr_20080409.pdf (last visited 15 October 2008).
49 See also, e.g., the case of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian detained in the United States and trans-
ferred to torture in Syria. ‘ Torture and accountability ’, International Herald Tribune, 19 November
2007.
50 See, e.g., Jeannie Shawl, ‘ US rejects German bid for extraction of CIA agents in el-Masri rendition ’,
Associated Press via Jurist Legal News & Research, 22 September 2007, available at http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/09/us-rejects-germany-bid-for-extradition.php (last visited 16 October 2008).
51 ‘ Italy indicts 31 linked to CIA rendition case ’, International Herald Tribune, 15 February 2007, available
at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/16/europe/EU-GEN-Italy-CIA-Kidnap.php (last visited 16 October
2008).
52 As regards the el-Masri case specifically, calls for an effective investigation into the involvement of
Macedonian officials have been reiterated. See, e.g., ICJ E-Bulletin on Counterterrorism & Human
Rights, ‘ FYR Macedonia : UN experts call for Macedonian investigation in El-Masri case ’, No. 24, June
2008, available at www.icj.org/IMG/E-Bulletin_June08.pdf (last visited 15 October 2008) : ‘ In April and
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One such example is the case of Boumediene and Ors v. Bosnia before the
European Court of Human Rights. The case concerns Bosnians of Algerian descent
held in Bosnia after 9/11 at the behest of the United States, eventually released by
Bosnian courts for lack of evidence against them, and immediately then arrested by
US authorities (apparently with some collusion from their Bosnian Counterparts)
and transferred to Guantanamo Bay. In addition to the now famous proceedings in
US courts,53 this case has also gone before the ECtHR in a challenge against the
Bosnian state for its part in the process.54
One of the questions arising is the nature and content of a state’s ongoing
obligations when it transfers or facilitates the transfer of an individual to a situation
where there is a real risk of serious human rights violations. One of the issues
that the Court itself has highlighted as a key consideration in the case is the extent
to which Bosnia is obliged to make diplomatic representations on behalf of in-
dividuals to ensure their rights are not violated following transfer.55
Rendition cases are also beginning to unfold in Africa.56 Reports allege, for
example, the involvement of Kenyan authorities, at US behest, in the rendition of
Somali and Kenyan nationals to Somalia and, in some cases, to Guanta´namo Bay.
It will be important to see what measure of justice is afforded in fora outside the
United States. Clearly, rendition litigation promises to be a growth area, as cases
seek to play their role in prising open the facts and pursuing justice against a range
of international players in this most challenging of areas.
May, the UN Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee expressed concerns about
the investigations carried out by the Former Republic of Macedonia in the abduction and ill-treatment of
Mr Khaled El-Masri when held by CIA agents in secret detention. The Committees advised the
Macedonian government to undertake a new and thorough investigation and the Human Rights Com-
mittee recommended that it should consider awarding him compensation ’. Human Rights Committee,
Ninety-second session, Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant : Concluding Observations Of The Human Committee : The Former Yugoslav Republic Of
Macedonia, 17 April 2008, available at www.icj.org/IMG/HRC_Macedonia.pdf (last visited 15 October
2008).
53 When these individuals took proceedings in US courts challenging the lawfulness of their transfer and
detention, it was at first held that the Military Commission Act prevented them from raising any claim in
a US court, until this was overturned by the Supreme Court’s June 2008 judgment.
54 Wilmer Hale, ‘ Guantanamo claims before EU Court of Human Rights ’, 14 March 2008, available at
www.haledorr.com/about/news/newsDetail.aspx?news=1134 (last visited 15 October 2008). For the
third-party intervention by INTERIGHTS and the ICJ, see www.interights.org. Boumidiene and Others v.
Bosnia and Herzogovina, Applications nos. 38703/06 et al, decided 18 November 2008. One of the
questions arising was the nature and content of a state’s ongoing obligations following transfer of an
individual to a situation where there is a real risk of serious human rights violations. However, the Court
found the case manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible on the grounds that, on the facts, Bosnia and
Herzegovina was taking all possible steps to the present date to protect the basic rights of the applicants.
55 See Applications 38703/06 et al, supra n.54, para 67.
56 See, e.g., Daniel Auma, ‘ US rendition on trial in Africa ’, Spero News, 25 September 2007, available at
www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=11196 (last visited 15 October 2008) ; see also Human Rights
Watch, ‘Why Am I Still Here ? ’ : The Horn of Africa Renditions and the Fate of the Missing, September
2008, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/eastafrica1008/ (last visited 15 October 2008). A case on
rendition of Kenyan nationals, for instance, is at the time of writing, before Kenyan courts.
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Issue 5: The ‘terrorism’ label and its implications for alleged
terrorists and others associated with them
The ‘terrorism’ label has been applied liberally since 9/11, without clarity as to its
scope (the term being undefined or ill-defined), often without due process, and
with serious consequences for those thus branded or others associated with them.
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon are the
various terrorism ‘lists ’ established at national, regional and (under the Security
Council’s watchful eye) international level. While systems and safeguards vary, the
problem with these lists is often the lack of transparency around the reasons for
inclusion in them, and the lack of meaningful opportunity to challenge such
inclusion. Little by little, litigation is seeking to call governments to account for
decisions made in this respect, and to provide a degree of judicial oversight at least
to temper an otherwise opaque and arbitrary practice.
Some success has been had by litigants before the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). In 2006 the Court held that individuals associated with a banned
organization had the right to reasons for their listing, to effective judicial protec-
tion and to be heard.57 Although disputed by the respondent state, the ECJ con-
firmed that while the common EU position that led to the listing in the first place
could not be reviewed by the Court, the decision to include a particular organiz-
ation on the list could. This robust approach was recently maintained by the Grand
Chamber of the ECJ in respect of listings authorized by the Security Council.58
Similar issues are currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights,
which might be expected to follow the human rights-friendly approach of the ECJ.
In 2008 a parallel case, challenging domestic listing procedures, made its
way through UK courts. On 7 May, the UK Court of Appeal upheld a decision of
the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission requiring the removal of an
Iranian opposition group from its blacklist of terror organizations.59 The case
illustrates the willingness of the courts, assessing in detail the facts and evidence
available, to challenge the Secretary of State’s determination that the organization
was concerned in terrorism. The Court was satisfied that the organization was no
longer engaged in violence, and it confirmed that proscription could not be justi-
fied on the basis that an organization had been engaged in violence and might at a
future date reacquire the capacity and intent to so engage.
57 European Court of Justice, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council of the European
Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case T.228/02, Judgment of The Court of
First Instance (Second Chamber), 12 December 2006.
58 Kadi and Yusef were unsuccessful in challenges at first instance : European Court of Justice, Case T.306/
01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3533,
21 September 2005, para. 73 (Yusuf) ; and Case T.315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR
II-3649, 21 September 2005 (Kadi). However, the challenges were won on appeal : Cases C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P, Judgment of Grand Chamber on 3 September 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp
/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-402/05 (last visited 15 October 2008). OMIC
case distinguished them because they involved the direct imposition of Security Council resolutions.
59 England and Wales Court of Appeal, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool
and Others, [2008] EWCA Civ 443, Judgment of 7 May 2008.
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The terrorism label can have far-reaching consequences not only for the
alleged terrorists themselves, but for others associated with them. One illustration
is found in a case currently being litigated in the ECtHR on behalf of the family of
the killed Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov.60 Laws in the Russian Federation that
were applied in this case stipulate that if persons deemed to be terrorists are killed
by the state in the course of counter-terrorist operations, their bodies will not be
returned to their families. This draconian measure targets families who are deeply
affected by being unable to duly observe a mourning period, pay their last respects
and bury their family member in accordance with Islamic religious requirements,
which according to their religious tradition may ultimately lead to the deceased
being denied access to heaven. While there is no meaningful relationship between
the prevention of terrorism and such a measure, it is justified by reference to the
deterrence of terrorism. This case, which has been declared admissible by the
ECtHR, provides an example of the blanket use of the ‘terrorist ’ label to justify
otherwise unacceptable special forms of treatment, and to punish those ‘as-
sociated’ with persons accused of ill-defined acts of terrorism.
A positive example of courts curbing the creeping effect of the notion of
guilt by association arose in an Australian case of 2007 – Haneef v. Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship (Federal Court of Australia).61 The case concerned
Mohamed Haneef, whose visa was revoked by Australian authorities on the
grounds that he was the second cousin of one of the men who had crashed a car
into Glasgow airport’s terminal building, had stayed in the same hostel and, on
leaving the country, had left him his mobile phone.
In the Australian courts the authorities argued that any form of ‘associ-
ation’ (family or other) with persons accused of this sort of criminal activity was
enough to fail the ‘character test ’ laid down in Australian immigration law. The
judgment rejected this contention and provided a fitting rebuke to the spreading
notion of guilt by association and the dangers of it. The judge questioned whether
he might also fall within the category of person having associated with terrorists,
given former professional association as a barrister. He held that, for the law to
apply, the ‘association’ must itself be of a criminal rather than of a family or
innocent nature.
I shall end this survey of cases by citing the observations of the government
of Botswana in a case pending before the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights :
We wish to recall here the bombings that occurred in London, Madrid and the
2001 events in NY and more recently Egypt. It is against this background that
60 ECtHR, Kusama Yazedovna Maskhadova and Others v. Russia, Application No. 18071/05, Decision as to
Admissibility, 8 July 2008. INTERIGHTS represents the applicants, the family of deceased Chechen
leader Aslan Maskhadov. The case has been declared admissible. INTERIGHTS, Maskhadov Press
Release, 1 October 2007, available at www.interights.org/view-document/index.htm?id=209 (last visited
15 October 2008).
61 Federal Court of Australia, Haneef v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2007] FCA 1273, 21
August 2007.
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Botswana reminds the Commission that the declaration of Mr Good as a
prohibited immigrant was made ‘in the interests of peace, stability and
national security ’ … We have given examples of traumatic results that occur
once there is a lapse in dealing with national security issues … If the President
visualizes a threat to national security, it is wrong for him to wait for the threat
to materialize into a national disaster. It is right to state that decisions whether
something is or is not in the interest of national security are not a matter for
any organ other than the executive.62
One might assume that this case concerned terrorism. In fact it concerns a
professor deported for criticizing presidential succession in Botswana. The facts
could not be much further removed from the terrorism context. Yet this case
exemplifies the extent to which national security, the global terrorist threat and the
exceptionalism of the war on terror are being relied upon to set aside human rights
in contexts that have nothing conceivably to do with international terrorism.
Concluding observations
The human rights picture
I said at the beginning of this article that litigation can serve to highlight key
human rights issues. The case developments described above illustrate, in my
view, some of these key characteristics of the war on terror as it impacts on human
rights.
An overarching point is that, leaving aside military aspirations, the main
policy aim being pursued after 9/11 was intelligence gathering. It was not and is not
about justice in the legal sense, certainly not about criminal responsibility. While
there may be many reasons contributing to this, it is suggested that this is con-
sistent with and borne out by the dearth of criminal prosecutions of high-level
al-Qaeda terrorist suspects. There have been more Supreme Court judgments on
whether Guanta´namo detainees have rights than there have been trials by military
commission or otherwise. The first military commission judgment handed down,
on 6 August 2008, convicts Osama Bin Laden’s driver for providing support for
known terrorists and sentences him to 66 months’ imprisonment, of which he
has already served 61.63 Seven years on, experience does not point to a massive
62 The government cites the decision of the Supreme Court of Botswana, the highest judicial authority in
Botswana, in Kenneth Good v. Attorney General, Civil Appeal No. 28/2005. An application to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was submitted by Interights on 10 October 2007 and was
pending at the time of writing. The brief for the applicant is obtainable from www.interights.org.
63 ‘ Bin Laden Driver Sentenced to a Short Term ’, William Glaberson, New York Times, 8 August 2008.
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global criminal justice campaign resulting in the investigation and prosecution of
high-level suspects, although undoubtedly many have been either killed or detained
and interrogated without charge.
Second, the cases illustrate that the means to achieve that intelligence has
involved violations of the most sacred human rights norms, notably torture and
arbitrary detention.
Third, to the extent that states may not themselves have engaged in tor-
ture, there has been widespread practice of playing fast and loose with safeguards
against torture that are part of the prohibition thereof and essential to give it
meaningful effect. The decision by some states to challenge the basic rules on non-
refoulement before the European Court of Human Rights illustrates this point.
Fourth, unprincipled distinctions have emerged recurrently. This may be
between nationals and non-nationals, as illustrated by widespread justification of
arbitrary detention of non-nationals. It may be between standards that officials are
expected to meet at home, and those considered applicable abroad, as highlighted
by the approach of certain states, and the restrictive judgment referred to on the
extra-territoriality issue. Or it may be evident in a ‘hands off ’ approach to torture
whereby distinctions are drawn between what states themselves do, and what they
facilitate or encourage at the hand of others, as noted in the case concerning torture
evidence, for example.
Fifth, and most insidious perhaps, has been the move from illegality to
extra-legality – the practice of removing individuals from the protection of the law
altogether, epitomized by rendition and disappearance that have been the subject
of various litigation initiatives.
Finally, there is the ‘creeping reach’ of measures and approaches that are
originally justified exceptionally in the context of international terrorism and
national security. The ‘terrorism’ and ‘national security ’ labels have been relied
upon to erode standards beyond those exceptional circumstances, to affect persons
loosely associated with persons loosely implicated in loosely defined acts of ter-
rorism. The result is that genuine exigencies of the global fight against international
terrorism are being brought to bear as a pretext for violations far beyond the
terrorism context.
The role of the courts and the impact of human rights litigation
It is clear is that in recent years, across diverse systems, there has been a burgeoning
of human rights litigation. That has reinforced the critical role for the courts in
human rights protection. Caution is due in trying to draw conclusions from
such wide-ranging practice, addressing different issues in diverse systems.
But I will offer a few tentative observations on how we might begin to think about
the practice of human rights litigation in this field to date and its potential
impact.
In many cases the judiciary has shown its reluctance to make determi-
nations that may impact on security, refusing, for example, to question executive
assessments of the existence of an emergency. But when particular practices
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have come under scrutiny, the courts in diverse systems have often and increasingly
proved themselves willing – in some cases promptly, in other cases after painstak-
ing process and only as a matter of genuine last resort – to criticize the legitimacy,
necessity or proportionality of particular measures.
While experience has been both positive and negative, I shall suggest the
following ways in which litigation may have had, or in some cases may yet have, a
positive effect.
First, simply taking a human rights violation to court frames the issue as a
matter of law, not only of politics. As such it reasserts the principle of legality and
the rule of law in the highly politicized discourse around terrorism and security.
Critically, these cases indicate, to varying degrees, the existence of a check on
executive action. This is seen in reminders that ‘a state of war is not a blank check
for the President ’ or by the willingness of courts in cases such as Belmarsh or
Haneef to subject to close scrutiny the determination of what was necessary for
national security. As a rebuke to the executive when it has failed in its role as
primary protector of rights, this can be critical in reasserting the democratic cre-
dentials of the system, which are often lost through the illegitimacy of the conduct
impugned.
Judgments have often, to quite varying degrees, been conservative and
characterized by judicial deference to political branches. One may ask whether the
US Supreme Court could and should have decided whether detainees have the
basic right to habeas corpus when the matter first came before it in 2004. At what
price in terms of judicial efficiency in the administration of justice – and protection
of individuals – came the virtue of judicial restraint? But so far as jurisprudence
reflects and deliberates on the thorny issue of the role of courts in determining such
matters, and on the relationship between political branches and the judiciary, it
may ultimately contribute to and enrich our understanding of the separation of
powers and the democratic judicial function.
Second, litigation can also serve as a catalyst to change law or practice. In
some cases, such as the changes in law and policy following the Belmarsh judgment,
the causal effect is fairly clear. In others, it is difficult to tell to what extent, if at all,
the irritant effect of litigation contributed to shifts in practice, such as the return of
UK nationals from Guanta´namo following unsuccessful litigation seeking to obli-
gate the state to intervene on their behalf.64 The course of litigation often itself
exposes particular policies and practices, and may lead states to clarify their own
policies or articulation of them.65
Judgments may themselves develop or clarify the law through jurispru-
dence or, as is often the case in the context of the war on terror, they may simply
serve to reinforce established principles that have increasingly been cast in doubt,
64 Abbasi case, above note 2.
65 See, e.g., the Al-Skeini case, above note 26, in which the UK government shifted its position as regards the
applicability of the ECHR to individuals detained by UK officials in Iraq and allegedly tortured in
detention.
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as in the Saadi judgment.66 The challenge in many of the cases highlighted has been
to hold ground rather than to advance the protection of human rights as such, in
other words to win back and keep winning gains that were made years ago, that
were thought secure but rendered vulnerable in the course of the war on terror.
Sometimes courts serve as democracy alerters whereby the interplay be-
tween judicial and political branches is such that a signal from the former can be a
catalyst to a more proactive approach by the latter. Persuasive judicial messages can
also be sent transnationally, as seen, for example, in the unusually robust judicial
rebuke of the system of Guanta´namo Bay detentions by the English Court of
Appeals in the Abbasi case.67
Cases can themselves play an important role in securing access to infor-
mation and in prising open facts, sometimes in face of a wall of state secrecy.
Litigation may have this as its goal – such as cases in the United Kingdom pursuing
access to military files,68 FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) litigation in the
United States which has had a measure of success69 and Canadian litigation where
the government was compelled to produce information or evidence in relation to
proceedings in another state70 – or this may be a by-product of the process. This
unearthing of information is particularly critical in areas such as rendition, charac-
terized by a concerted cover-up. At a minimum litigation draws out government
positions – as seen, for example, in the shift in positions of the UK government in
the course of the al Skeini case – as they engage as parties and clarify or adjust their
positions in the course of litigation.
Litigation of the sort referred to also opens legal systems to the cross-
fertilization of ideas from other systems as international and comparative per-
spectives are brought to bear, notably through amicus interventions. Guanta´namo
litigation in the United States has been perhaps the most massive piece of inter-
national human rights litigation ever, if judged at least by the unprecedented level
and nature of interventions before the Supreme Court.71
Ultimately, the impact of litigation on human rights issues generally lies in
its gradual contribution to social change. There has, for example, been a shift in
66 This works both ways and can also weaken or confuse the framework of rights protection, as is suggested
may have been the outcome of the Al-Skeini case, for example.
67 R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2003] UKHRR 76, where the
English Court of Appeal criticized the system of Guantanamo detentions in unusually strident terms.
68 John Aston, ‘ Lawyers in Basra death case win access to files ’, Independent, 4 October 2007.
69 See, e.g., US District Court for the Southern District of New York, Associated Press v. United States
Department of Defense, 498 F. Supp. 2d 707 (SDNY, 2007), and US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit, Center
for National Security Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (DC Cir. 2003) (cert denied, 540 US 1104
(2004)).
70 Supreme Court of Canada, Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, 23 May 2008. On 23 May 2008, the
Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the government had violated Canada’s Constitution and its inter-
national human rights obligations by transmitting to US official information resulting from Canadian
officials’ interviews of Omar Kadhr at the Guanta´namo Bay detention centre. The Court took the
unusual step of ordering Canadian officials to allow Mr Kadhr access to records of his interrogations
with Canadian agents, for use in preparing his defence before the Guanta´namo Military Commission.
71 Amicus interventions appeared from such diverse quarters as British Lords as well as Israeli military
lawyers.
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public opinion (national and international) on Guanta´namo, and arguably liti-
gation may have been an important contributor. What is undoubtedly true is that
litigation has to be understood not in isolation but as one small piece of a much
bigger and more complex puzzle.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, real cases serve to tell the victims’
stories. They provide often graphic illustrations of what euphemisms such as
‘extraordinary rendition’ and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques ’ mean to hu-
man beings like you or me. Judgments validate those stories and experiences. One
of the essential characteristics of the ‘war on terror ’ has been the attempt to put
certain people beyond the reach of the law. Litigation can be a tool, as one English
judge put it, not for transferring power from the executive to the judiciary, but for
transferring power from the executive to the individual.72 If any particular case can
bring an individual back into the legal framework, and reassert the individual as a
rights-bearer and human being, then perhaps that is impact enough.
72 Dame Mary Arden has stated that ‘ the decision in the A case should not be misinterpreted as a transfer of
power from the executive to the judiciary. The position is that the judiciary now has the important task
of reviewing executive action against the benchmark of human rights. Thus, the transfer of power is not
to the judiciary but to the individual ’. (2005) 121 LQR at pp. 623–4, in A. T. H. Smith, ‘ Balancing liberty
and security ? A legal analysis of United Kingdom anti-terrorist legislation ’, European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research, 13 (2007), pp. 73–83, DOI 10.1007/s10610-007-9035-6.
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